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Despite the fact that policymakers often have a short-term horizon and prefer 
discretionary over rule bound policy, one can observe policy reform with a 
focus on rules and long-term orientation. Sometimes reforms are driven by 
crisis, sometimes they are pursued in times of relative prosperity. The paper 
analyses reform processes theoretically under the assumption of imperfect 
knowledge.  
After the introduction, the second section of the paper shows that rule bound 
policy encourages a long-term orientation of policymakers, resulting in higher 
economic dynamics as compared with discretionary policy. In the third section, 
the political economy of the reform process, i.e. replacing discretionary by rule-
bound policy, is analysed in an evolutionary setting. The basic hypothesis is 
that a policy reform is triggered in a feedback-process determined by four key 
factors: (1) an emerging shadow economy and growing corruption, (2) 
external, in particular international pressure, (3) increasing knowledge of 
policymakers with respect to the effectiveness of policy paradigms and (4) 
improved economic knowledge of the public. In a fourth section, we draw 
conclusions and present some preliminary empirical evidence.  
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"From Short-Term to Long-Term Orientation – Political 
Economy of the Policy Reform Process" 
 





Economic policymaking is often driven by short-term interventionist activities, 
which on average causes serious economic problems. The explanations for 
continuous discretionary policies is of political economy nature. Indeed, it 
seems plausible that policymakers perceive the public’s problems of 
forecasting future policy paths as an advantage, which they can exploit to e.g. 
appear as the active caring politician willing to offer a remedy to market failure 
or to produce a short-term upswing within the election cycle. This may give 
them a competitive edge over their political rivals. Thus, political rationality is 
deviating from economic rationality.  
This deviation may carry on for a long time. Despite the negative effects of 
discretion, it can be observed that a paradigm shift towards long-term-
orientation takes much time. Nevertheless reforms happen and can be only 
partly explained by political economy models: The standard explanation of 
reforms in such models is either decreasing opportunity costs of counter-
lobbying or pathological learning, i.e. the increasing need to change the 
situation because of its permanent worsening. Not much room is given to 
active learning processes and the problem of limited information and 
knowledge both of politicians and other policy actors.  
In this paper, we are particularly interested in theoretically analysing learning in 
politics and reform processes by means of positive economics. Our main 
hypothesis is that learning processes – both active and pathological – drive the 
process towards a policy reform. Therefore, – and contrary to the standard 
political economy assumption of perfect knowledge – we introduce imperfect 
knowledge into the analysis of the policy process. Policymakers as well as the 
public are not fully informed. At the same time it allows for active learning – as   2
opposed to pathological learning – and may us equip with an argument to 
explain changes in the policy regime with other than pathological explanations.  
The second section of the paper briefly justifies the claim of long-term oriented 
economic policy being superior to discretionary policy and being equivalent to 
rule-bound policy. However, it is not easy to implement rules in an institutional 
setting with selfish and politically rational actors, given the situation is correctly 
analysed by political economists. An appeal to the politicians to behave long-
term oriented completely seems pointless and self-referential, as it requires to 
abandon the very conditions having led to the short-term orientation (Witt 
1992). Nevertheless, one can observe the introduction of policy rules to an 
increasing extent, indicating a growing long-term orientation. Section III of the 
paper positively analyses the conditions under which such a shift towards rules 
can occur. The political economy logic suggest to view the problem as a 
process with different ways to learn. Some preliminary empirical evidence is 
given in the conclusions. 
 
II. Rules as long-term orientation 
Economic theory (from different schools of thought) as well as empirical 
evidence can show that arbitrariness and short-term horizons in economic 
policymaking regularly cause more economic harm than benefits. The 
normative conclusion is straightforward: economic policymaking should be 
long-term oriented
1 and not simply interpreted as a means to do away with 
market failure and to stimulate the economy in the short run; it is also not 
sufficient to reduce it to a number of instruments in different fields.  
This conclusion leads us to the recommendation to restrict the discretionary 
leeway of policymakers by policy rules. By rules, we understand constitutional 
policy rules in the sense of Brennan and Buchanan (1981) to bind politicians. 
The rules should be designed according to current and empirically founded 
economic knowledge. Too precisely formulated rules, such as rules for certain 
authorities what to do when in which case, e.g. Friedman’s k-percent-rule for 
monetary policy, are not included, as they suggest that economic knowledge is   3
perfectly fixed and not subject to changes due to learning. An example for a 
constitutional policy rule is an independent central bank: the policy instruments 
to meet a given objective (price stability) are chosen according to current 
knowledge. This understanding does not exclude stabilisation policy as an 
answer to an external shock with a subsequent recession, provided it is 
according to set of rules for economic policymakers. 
Why is a binding rule better than discretionary policies and in how far 
represents the rule a long term view while discretion means reacting short-
sighted? There are mainly two theoretical arguments to apply binding rules 
rather than discretionary policies in economic decision-making. These are the 
problem of time-consistency and the problem of the political business cycle. 
The time-consistency problem originates from Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
The basic conclusion is that, if the government does not follow any rules, a 
politically optimal policy at one point of time does not remain the optimal policy 
at a later point of time, although nothing in the framework has changed. The 
result is discretionary policymaking by the government as this change of 
optimal policies occurs repeatedly. The government is trying to mislead the 
public for its own good, i.e. it announces a certain policy for a period which the 
public should believe and afterwards, surprise, the government changes the 
policy. This is optimal now as the public already made its economic decisions 
according the earlier announcements and cannot change the decisions 
anymore. Optimal policy, where the public expectations have not build yet, 
differs from optimal policy after the public has made its decisions. As 
individuals learn, they will not trust the government’s announcement a second 
time and will anticipate this governmental behaviour. Consequently, the 
economic outcome will be worse than planned as discretion does not create 
the surprising effects it intends to, while the costs of volatile policies, e.g. lower 
investment by private agents due to insecure future, remain. 
The problem of time-consistency may be analysed by applying game theoretic 
methods, following, for example, Persson (1988, pp. 520ff) and 
                                                                                                                              
1  The long term is difficult to define. We assume it being significantly longer than the 
election cycle.    4
Blackburn/Christensen (1989, pp. 14ff)
2. In a one shot game with full 
information, the government will announce a certain policy which is welfare-
optimizing at this point of time, taking into consideration that public 
expectations have not been formed yet. After the public has built its 
expectations, the optimal welfare-maximising plan changes, as the public 
behaviour to the policy cannot change anymore. But with the public also fully 
informed and having rational expectations, it will expect this behaviour. The 
result in this case will always be pareto-inferior
3. Only precommitment to a 
certain policy rule, meaning that the government does not change the plan 
during the period, so the public expectations are being fulfilled, will lead to the 
best result. Of course, the rule has to be credible, so „reoptimising“ policy has 
to be costly for the government. 
The problem of time-consistency gets less severe when infinitely repeated 
games are applied to the problem. In this case, even without strict 
precommitment, it becomes less attractive to leave the announced policy, as 
this will have impacts on the future. If the government changes its 
preannounced policy, the public will „punish“ the government by expecting the 
government to „cheat“ in the future, i.e. the government loses „reputation“ in 
future periods, resulting in inferior economic outcomes.
4 The government has 
to weight the profit of deviating from the announced policy, i.e. gaining today, 
to the cost of lost reputation, i.e. losing tomorrow. As normally the future 
counts less than the present in policymaking, the economic outcome with 
reputation lies in between the result of discretion and rule binding, so the rule 
remains the best long-run solution.
5
The binding rule gets more important in a situation with repeated games 
without perfect information where the public learns only gradually which policy 
                                            
2  They analyse the time-consistency problem in monetary policy, where the 
government’s welfare function is dependent on unemployment and inflation. Lower 
unemployment than the natural rate is only possible by creating surprise inflation, 
which means „misleading“ the public.  
3  For the case of monetary policy, the problem of time-consistency will lead to high 
inflation without affecting the natural rate of unemployment. 
4  For example, after one period of surprise inflation, trade unions will expect higher 
inflation in the future; therefore they will demand higher wages resulting in higher 
unemployment. 
5  To be exact, the result in the reputational process depends on how the future is 
discounted (Barro and Gordon 1983).   5
the government is trying to follow. Now credibility as a signal is very important, 
if the government wants to behave welfare-maximising and the most credible 
solution remains the rule to show the learning public that the government is not 
trying to cheat. 
Not only the problem of time-consistency requires binding rules to avoid 
economical inferior results from political decision-making in the long run. As 
public choice theory teaches us, governmental behaviour is not always 
welfare-maximising as politicians have their own goals, which may differ from 
the economically best ones. Nordhaus (1975) describes the incentive for 
policymakers to adopt discretionary, surprising instruments in the sight of 
elections to stimulate the economic performance to win the election. The costs 
of this policy, e.g. high interest rates for debt financed programs, higher 
inflation by expansive monetary policy, recessions etc. have to be paid after 
the election.
6 This is the concept of political business cycles, explaining 
economical fluctuations as at least partly caused by discretionary 
policymaking. A binding rule, from which it is costly to deviate, would prevent 
the policymaker from creating fluctuations if the cost of deviating from the rule, 
i.e. lost reputation resulting in the loss of votes, is higher than the benefit, i.e. 
winning votes due to a business cycle peak before the election. 
As a result so far, the problem of time-consistency as well as the problem of 
political business cycles demand for credible binding rules in fields where it is 
possible for policymakers to deviate from a preannounced policy to get short-
term advantages (i.e. discretion) without considering the long term drawbacks 
on the same level. Predictable, credible, long-term oriented policy will create 
better outcome than a policy which is trying to follow some period wise 
optimisation.  
Empirical results for fields with binding rules show evidence for the theory. 
Research so far concentrated on the problem of time-consistency in monetary 
policy, where the pre-commiting strategy is identified as an independent 
                                            
6  Note that it is crucial for the original Nordhaus concept that the public does not realize 
the routine in the governmental behaviour. With rational expectations and full 
information, there will be no positive effect on the business cycle (see e.g. Nordhaus 
1989). With rational expectations but without full information, the possibility of political 
business cycles returns (Rogoff and Sibert 1988).    6
central bank which does not try to lower unemployment by creating surprise 
inflation.  Most research finds robust empirical support for the theoretical view 
that inflation is lower in countries with independent central banks, though other 
effects on the economy (e.g. growth) are less clear according to the literature.
7 
Saade (2002) adopted the discretion vs. rules problem to the tax policy. As in 
the problem of monetary policy, without commitment the government chooses 
discretionary policy, creating unexpected tax changes. Empirical evidence for 
the US shows that unexpected tax changes lead to lower growth. A binding 
rule, where no unexpected tax changes exist, would be better in the long term.  
This does not imply that a rule has to remain the same for good. As time goes 
by, the economic knowledge evolves, old concept seem to be not valid any 
more or even to be wrong, and new ideas turn out to be best practice. 
Therefore, a rule has to be changeable, if new knowledge or new situations 
come up. Still, it has to be costly to change the rule, as otherwise discretionary 
policy may return. But if the knowledge about the rule has changed, and it is 
important new knowledge, the benefits of implementing the new rule will 
probably outweigh the costs. 
We have shown so far that in the long run, the optimal plan from the 
unrestricted politician’s point of view does not create the best possible 
outcome as he has an incentive to optimise discretionary for short periods. 
Binding rules limit the possibility of short term optimisation, leading to better 
outcomes in the long term. These frameworks explain why politicians have a 
strong incentive to act discretionary, explaining some of the economic 
problems many countries are facing, e.g. high inflation and high taxes with low 
growth. But how works the transition from discretion to long term oriented rules 
and why decide politicians to give away some of their influence? 
 
III. Policy reform as “evolutionary” path to “revolution” 
According to standard political economy reasoning, in section II we view the 
government as a group of selfish and utility maximising indivduals. On the so-
called political market, policymakers respond to demand for special treatment, 
                                            
7  See, for example, De Haan et al. (2003). For an overview of existing empirical   7
thereby granting advantages to well-organised groups at the expense of less 
organised groups (Olson 1965). In this section we additionally assume that the 
policymakers are suffering from a substantial lack of information, from unclear 
preferences and from a selective perception of the reality. Therefore, their 
decisions are characterised by erroneous evaluation of the situation at hand 
and by an incomplete and selective process of information generation (Witt 
2003, pp. 79ff)
8. The same holds with all other actors. In our analysis these are 
lobbies, representing special interests, scientists, policy advisors, external 
actors such as foreign governments as well as international organisations and 
the public.
9  
Before we look at the process itself, it makes sense to distinguish between 
knowledge and information, which is a distinction between stock and flows. We 
define knowledge as the sustainable stock of information, which the individual 
has accumulated and filtered from the permanent inflow of information. The 
inflow of information does not add unlimitedly to the knowledge, as the human 
mind is limited with respect to its information processing capacity. Following 
Witt (1996), we make the following assumptions about individual information 
processing: 
1.  limited long-term memory; accumulated knowledge may be written off; 
2. limited  short-term  memory constraints information processing capacity; 
3.  selective attention process; 
4.  interpretation pattern follows existing rather than new knowledge; 
5.  attention and interpretation pattern follows existing preferences. 
Preferences play an important role for the learning process. It is dependent on 
the preferential structure, which information is processed and which is not 
considered. Witt (1996) distinguishes the shift effect, i.e. the attention given to 
information shifts away from hitherto less intensively perceived information, 
and the refinement effect, i.e. more attention is given to already intensively 
                                                                                                                              
literature, see Berger et al. (2001). 
8  For our purpose, the distinction between maximising and satisficing behaviour is not 
decisive. See Meier and Durrer (1992) for a careful discussion of the behaviour of 
politicians within the framework of a cognitive image of man. 
9  We concentrate on individual learning in contrast to institutional learning.    8
perceived information.
10 We follow this distinction, as on the one hand it pretty 
much explains, why new information about economic relationships only slowly 
(if at all) reaches the attention of policymakers. On the other hand, this 
explanation does not exclude the perception of new and better information. It 
only can explain the sticky nature of familiar knowledge, which is according to 
the preferences – and sometimes prejudices and ideologies – policymakers 
have.  
We also introduce the time dimension explicitly, which is in Figure 1 illustrated 
by the bold broken arrow between the field Discretion and the field Rules. This 
framework enables us to model a process comprising of active as well as 
pathological learning, which can produce hypotheses about the speed with 
which this process ends in a policy reform, implying an increasing long-term 
orientation. In light of these preliminaries, we now discuss the “evolutionary” 
feedback process including the different actors, finally leading to the reform 
step as the “revolution”. 
 
The process of pathological learning 
In a political economy setting, the policymakers’ preference for discretion is 
highly plausible. We start by assuming a policy framework with a high degree 
of discretionary leeway for the government with respect to economic 
policymaking. Examples are a dependent central bank, an intervention prone 
social security system and ad-hoc fiscal policy. The question then is, whether 
and if so, how an economic policy reform and the implementation of policy 
rules, which is the plausible normative policy conclusion, theoretically can 
happen.  
As shown in section II, such a policy environment is likely to cause economic 
problems, i.e. inflation tends to be substantial, social security arbitrary, fiscal 
policy unsustainable and unemployment high. Given the incentive structure of 
the main actors, their selective perception and limited knowledge, we do not 
                                            
10  In contrast to standard analysis, one may also argue that preferences themselves also 
are subject to changes. However, changes in preferences take a long time and are 
more difficult to model than information based learning, albeit using the same 
categories of effects.   9
expect that they change their policy model due to this experience immediately. 
Instead, a feedback process with action and reaction begins.  
Let us start within the standard political economy framework, leaving the 
capacity of politicians to actively learn aside for a moment. The above 
mentioned scenario will produce reactions from the different actors. To start 
with the government, it is not willing and able to pursue a policy reform; 
instead, its most probable reaction is to intensify the interventions to mitigate 
the problems; one example may be to increase taxes to raise revenues. 
Interest groups unwilling to give up their privileges demand for more ad-hoc 
action and increasing public spending to solve the problems, which does not 
improve the economic performance of the country.
11 The gap between political 
and economic rationality increases during this process. 
The worsening of the economic situation leads to private agents facing 
decreasing opportunity cost of activities in the shadow economy. Therefore, 
their size will probably rise, both relatively with respect to GDP and 
absolutely.
12 With a growing share of shadow economy, the effectiveness of 
economic policy decreases, worsening the economic performance of the 
country even further. This in turn will induce a number of reactions. It is 
plausible that the government will take measures against the shadow 
economy. Thereby, it has two different options: direct and indirect measures. 
Without active learning about the concept of opportunity cost, the government 
will directly intervene and e.g. intensify control and/or equip the tax bureaus 
with better resources to search for tax evasion. In addition, it can take steps to 
raise the sanctions against agents in the shadow economy. The likely reaction 
of the public is less activities in the shadow economy, leaving people worse off 
as they on the one hand lose income in the shadow economy, and on the 
other hand remain unable to generate higher income on the regular markets. 
Thus, aggregate activities in the regular markets also tend to decrease as 
consequence of the reduced aggregate purchasing power (Schneider and 
                                            
11  Interest groups, whose members suffer from the policy will certainly invest into 
counter-lobbying to change the policy. The worse their situation, the lower the 
opportunity cost of counter-lobbying (Becker 1983 and 1985). However, it is not clear 
whether such activities are leading to less discretion. 
12  For causes of underground activities see Schneider and Enste (2000, pp. 82-88).   10
Enste 2000, p. 78). Indirectly, we see another reduction of opportunity cost of 
shadow activities following the initial increase. Shadow activities will spur 
again; the government will probably react like before. As long as vested 
interests can receive net gains from the situation, they will support the 
government to stop this illegal form of competition. 
A similar, but not identical feedback process is likely to occur with respect to 
corruption. Increasing interventionism in combination with fiscal problems and 
unemployment gives way to selective economic policy, e.g. industrial policy 
and trade protection and reduces resources available for public purchases 
facing a given supply side. Assuming that corruption was negligible before, 
increasing rent-seeking activities associated with selective policy measures as 
well as intensified competition for public procurement may have the 
consequence of corruptive behaviour (Mauro 1998).
13  
An increase in corruption is harmful to the economy, as the signal sent to 
private agents home and abroad deflects investment and reduces employment 
even more in the medium run. In addition, empirical evidence indicates that the 
structure of public spending changes with increasing corruption: bigger, 
unproductive projects are likely to raise more illegal income for the officials 
(Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). Unproductive public spending is contributing to 
deeper economic problems and thereby to the vicious circle.  
It seems plausible and is supported by empirical evidence that underground 
activities and corruption are complementary. The more corruption one finds in 
a country, the higher is the share of shadow activities with respect to GDP 
(Schneider and Enste 2000, pp. 90f). Jointly, these two feedback processes 
are not only causing economic problems, but may also change the public 
attitude towards these activities and public behaviour. The public views about 
borderlines between immoral and tolerable behaviour may shift – shadow 
activities and corruption may become increasingly tolerable under the new 
institutional setting. Such a development is likely to increase the economic 
                                            
13  Paldam (2002) shows that corruption is positively correlated with high regulation, high 
inflation and low per-capita GDP.   11
problems. The strength of such a shift may in turn be dependent on the extent 
to which the rule of law is generally accepted in the country. 
14  
Without active learning, this process will end in the well-known Olsonian 
(1982) process of “decline of nations”, in which an external shock will be 
necessary to reallocate resources and power. In other words, learning takes 
place pathologically. This feedback process is shown in the lower part of 
Figure 1, illustrated by arrows no. 1 through 4 and can be summarised as 
follows: discretion leads to poor economic performance (1); this causes 
underground activities and corruption to increase (2); vested interests are 
trying to maintain their position (4); government interventions will increase, 
causing even deeper problems. Finally, a sclerotic society needs the external 
shock. 
However, one can assume that forces are working in the opposite direction, 
namely to narrow the gap between political and economic rationality. Whereas 
in the foregoing analysis, this gap does not decrease, but increase over time, 
these forces enable politicians to narrow it via the introduction of policy rules. 
These forces are foreign influences and growing knowledge. The upper half of 
Figure 1 and arrows no. 5 through 9, show the factors completing the picture, 
which then changes remarkably.  
 
Foreign scapegoats 
To start with foreign support (see Figure 1), it is highly plausible to give up the 
implicit assumption of an isolated country with completely autonomous 
policymakers. Economic policy takes increasingly place within a global 
environment, implying that policy decisions in one country affect the economic 
situation in others. Discretionary domestic policy is even more risky than in the 
closed economy (Donges and Freytag 1998). In addition, politicians facing an 
economic slowdown and domestic policy constraints like those discussed 
above can make use of international agreements or foreign pressure to adopt 
a policy rule and give up discretion. At least in the long run, international 
                                            
14  See Rose-Ackermann (1999, chapter 6).   12
pressures raise doubts about discretion (arrow no. 5 in Figure 1).
15 In general, 
international agreements restrict policymakers to protect import competing 
industries or to run excessive public budget deficits; pressure by international 
organisations add to these policy constraints. Both forms can be taken as 
scapegoat to overcome vested interests (Vaubel 1991, Freytag 2002, pp. 172-
5). External sovereignty is traded to gain internal sovereignty. In the history of 
policy reform one can find overwhelming empirical evidence for this theory 
(see below). Nevertheless, international agreements are breached quite 
regularly before policy reforms are made, in other words it often takes a long 
time before governments make use of the described scapegoat function.  
 
Active learning in the government and the public 
Learning processes are not exclusively pathological, but are also influenced by 
increasing economic knowledge of both politicians and the public. If the 
government turns the wheel before the economic situation has become 
unbearable, we talk of active learning, which seems economically superior. 
Thus, one can construct an antagonism between these two concepts of 
learning. The strength of active learning depends on the relative strength of the 
shift effect and the refinement effect, which in turn are dependent on the 
following factors. 
A free press and free universities with independent scholars (in other words: a 
market for information) will reduce both effects, as information will be very 
diverse and competing for the attention of policymakers. By contrast, a uniform 
press and politically dependent universities will not provide other information 
than one in line with the government’s preferences. An additional factor 
working against the stickiness of knowledge and its structure is the fact, that 
the incoming information permanently changes with a worsening of the 
economic situation. These changes occur both with respect to the number of 
news as well as their intensity and thereby have a strong impact on the 
                                            
15  In the short run, the opposite effect may also occur: the worsening of the economic 
situation is perceived as reaction to external competition. This perception encourages 
the government to protect domestic factors of production – which of course implies 
more discretion.   13
knowledge (and eventually even on the preferences) of policymakers and 
private agents (arrow no. 6 in Figure 1).  
How does information cause active learning (see Figure 1) and, thus change 
political rationality towards a match with economic rationality? Assume that 
policymakers at the beginning of the economic recession feel quite 
comfortable with the situation. Discretion gives policymakers the opportunity to 
appear active and alert, which they prefer over the restriction of a rule, which 
gives them the impression of being a type of policy robot. They will seek 
advice from economists, social scientists, media and consulting firms sharing 
their preferences and ideology. One can even assume that seats in (formally 
independent) advisory boards and commissions will be preferably given to 
individuals who share the government’s preferences. This advice will be give 
attention to and sold to the public as proof of good governance; given 
assumptions 1 to 5 above, they are also perceived as good governance by the 
government itself (refinement effect). The advisors – being as limited as the 
government and being interested in further appointments – will not argue 
against the government. On the one hand, the process increasingly becomes 
self-referential. On the other hand, still assuming an ever worse economic 
situation, the process will come to a natural end, as active learning starts.  
As long as the economic situation is slightly acceptable, advice in the opposite 
direction will be given less to no attention (shift effect). However, increasing 
empirical evidence about negative effects of discretion and positive effects of 
rule-bound policy changes the relative weight of opposing information: first, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for policymakers to immunise themselves 
against bad news about the negative effects of discretionary interventions. 
They increasingly learn about economic relationships. At the same time, the 
knowledge about these relationships increases, as research efforts to 
overcome the bad economic situation are intensified.
16 Among politicians 
doubts are rising about the effectiveness of the discretionary, short-term 
                                            
16  Science as such can also be seen as feedback process, both internally and 
considering developments in reality. Research efforts may not only result in 
fundamentally new ideas, but also in better presentation of ideas, which are common 
sense in academia, but not yet in politics and in the public.   14
oriented policy (arrow no. 7 in Figure 1). Both the shift effect and the 
refinement effect now start to work in the opposite direction. 
These doubts are not sufficient for giving up the policy direction; nevertheless, 
political arguments for discretion are weakened. Second, learning takes place 
in the public. Provided with better theoretical and empirical arguments, the 
public gathers new knowledge (arrow no. 8 in Figure 1). The burden of proof 
will probably be reversed, implying that those vested interests being politically 
supported at the expense of others, have to argue their case more carefully 
and feel pressure by the public (arrow no. 9 in Figure 1). The increased 
knowledge will enable the public also to exert pressure on the government, at 
least indirectly through the coming election (arrow no. 10 in Figure 1).
17  
At the same time, politicians of the government as well of the opposition may 
take steps to learn actively and to introduce reform as a result of political 
competition. Politicians then act as Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, offering new 
products. Thus, political competition can encourage policy reform, as 
politicians eager to be (re-)elected try to convince the public of new policy 
approaches. Given that short-term orientation has proven pointless, this 
search for an alternative can result in long-term orientation. However, it is not a 
priori clear, whether or not political competition results in welfare improvement 
or not. The classical political economy argument is that political competition 
results in welfare losses, as politicians try to offer (new or old) political 
products that serve special interests, thereby exploiting the lack of knowledge 
and high opportunity cost of counter-lobbying in the public (Freytag 1995, p. 
241). On the other hand, Wohlgemuth (2000) – referring to Tullock (1965) – 
suggests that political competition with barriers to entry encourages political 
rivals to take risks and to offer radical reform proposals. The higher the 
barriers, the higher the promised benefits for the public.
18
                                            
17  See Freytag (2002, chapter 8). Arrow no. 9 as well as arrow no. 10 can also be 
interpreted as the reaction of losers of the situation. The worse the economic situation, 
the lower the opportunity costs of lobbying for the losers (Becker 1983 and 1985). This 
effect is independent of active learning, it seems rather an example of pathological 
learning. 
18  Which effect is more likely, is left to empirical research.   15
This process of active learning by both politicians and private agents will add 
to the process of pathological learning and foreign support. Although a precise 
prognosis about the relative strength of these processes is difficult to make, it 
seems plausible that active learning has to reflect the underlying economic 
problems, which of course takes time. Thus the pathological process as well 
as international pressure/support probably have a stronger impact in the short 
run. The process of active learning does not start without a certain lag.  
None of the lines of argument put forward in this section so far, is fully new. 
However, jointly they provide a strong theoretical argument why policy reform 
towards a more rule bound policy can happen and how it is pursued. Despite 
the process character of learning, any policy reform is a structural break. In 
Figure 1, this break illustrated through the broken arrow connecting Discretion 
and Rules and marked through the grey circle. It is exactly this break (or as 
called in the heading to this section: shift from evolution to revolution), we 
focus upon in what follows.    16




























• political  learning 
processes 











Changes in public 
behavior: 
• shadow  economy
• corruption 
• reversed  burden 
of proof 
5 












P PA AT TH HO OL LO OG GI IC CA AL L   L LE EA AR RN NI IN NG G
F FO OR RE EI IG GN N   
S SU UP PP PO OR RT T 
A AC CT TI IV VE E   
L LE EA AR RN NI IN NG G 
1 
6 
D DO OU UB BT TS S   
N NE EW W   K KN NO OW WL LE ED DG GE E
10   17
The timing of the structural break 
The theoretical considerations lead to some conclusions about the time of the 
process of shifting from discretion to rule-bound policy, in other words: from 
short-term to long-term orientation. In general, this time depends on the 
absolute relative strength of the arrows no. 1 to no. 10 in Figure 1, which itself 
depends on the institutional constraints in the country.  
First, we discuss the absolute strength and the timing. A shift from short-term 
to long-term orientation within an environment of economic slowdown is the 
more probable,  
•  the faster the economic slowdown, in other words: the more intense 
pathological learning (arrows no. 1 through 4);  
• the better educated and the more equipped to process incoming 
information about economic relations the public, in other words: the higher 
the pressure the public can exert on vested interests and the government 
(arrows no. 9 and 10); 
•  the more competition on the market for information exists, in other words: 
the more likely it is that the government will be reached by new information 
not in accordance with its preferences; then the shift and refinement effect 
are relatively small (arrow no. 7). 
•  the better the country is integrated into the world economy; then both the 
pressure from the world market as well as the foreign support to pursue 
reforms increases (arrow no. 5); 
• whether political competition encourages reform, is not to decide 
theoretically.  
In a second step, we analyse the relative importance of active versus 
pathological learning. Although it is crucial to know more about the speed of 
the process, it is highly desirable from a normative perspective to know how to 
implement reforms without significant pathological learning. The factors 
affecting the speed of course also influence the relative strength of both ways 
of learning. To start with integration of the country into the world economy, it 
seems plausible that it has a positive impact on the society’s ability to learn   18
actively. Better examples and explicit information by foreign agencies and 
governments may decrease the importance of the shift and refinement effect. 
Second, there may be a self-reinforcing effect with respect to rules. If rule 
bound policy – e.g. in monetary and competition policy – has a long tradition in 
the country, the speed of active learning in other policy areas increases. If not, 
the process of pathological learning may be stronger – implying that the reform 
will be pursued later. Third, a good average education level in the public about 
economic relationships may foster active learning in politics, the level of 
education is better with a free press and independent universities and research 
facilities. However, the level of economic education may reflect the usage of 
rule bound policy. There may be another self-reinforcing element in the 
process. To summarise, it seems plausible that the relative strength of active 
learning increases with the level of knowledge already accrued in society. 
Additionally, the degree and speed of the implementation of new ideas is 
dependent from the institutional surrounding in the country. For example, 
complex federal systems like in Germany need active learning on many levels 
of institutions, as otherwise implementing a new policy is not possible. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The paper has analysed the relative importance of two divergent feedback 
processes in economic policymaking and their effects on the implementation of 
policy rules as remedy for the negative impacts of discretionary policy on the 
economic performance of a country. The central message is that any policy 
reform takes place at the end of such an evolutionary process with active and 
pathological learning.  
Empirical evidence of economic policy reform in history is rich and covers wide 
areas of policymaking. To finish this paper and to give an idea for further 
research, we take a look at monetary policy in younger history. Monetary 
policy in the world used to be characterised by discretion throughout the first 
30 years after WWII, with a few exceptions. Since the early 1980s, there is a 
growing concern for independent central banks. We can observe both active 
and pathological learning as well as foreign support to transform this concern 
in real policy.    19
To start with pathological learning, there is overwhelming evidence that all 
cases of hyper inflation are caused by excessive budget deficits. Governments 
were unable to control their public spending and started to monetise the 
budget deficits (Fischer, Sahay and Vegh 2002). In many of these cases, only 
after a period of high and costly inflation, a successful monetary reform with 
the introduction of policy rules – either via central bank independence or via 
currency board or similar arrangements – was pursued
19.  
Many of these reforms were accompanied by foreign support. The IMF, the 
European Union or single countries exerted formal pressure or gave formal 
support to introduce the rule. Examples are a number of monetary reforms in 
Latin America or the introduction of central bank independence in accession 
candidates to the EMU, let alone the founding members of the EMU, e.g. 
France, Italy and Spain. 
These countries indeed form a group of countries where we could observe 
active learning. During the existence of the EMS, these countries were more or 
less forced by the Bundesbank to adopt a monetary policy directed at price 
stability. This has certainly taught policymakers and the public that inflation is 
not costless. As a parallel process, the Phillips-trade-off lost its academic 
credential; new empirical evidence about the relation between unemployment 
and inflation diffused and changed the existing knowledge (and probably also 
preferences) of policymakers and private agents.  
So, we can observe all processes taking place parallely, albeit with different 
speed in different countries. Future research should be dedicated to the 
question of what exactly distinguishes countries with a high share of 
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